T - Battle of Trafalgar, 21 October 1805
Trafalgar is the best-known of Nelson's great victories and has acquired a symbolic significance that far exceeds its actual importance in the conduct of the great war against France of 1793–1815. A number of myths have gathered around it – the most persistent of which is that it saved Britain from invasion. In fact by the time the battle was fought, Napoleon's over-ambitious invasion plan had already been thwarted by the skilful strategic moves of First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Barham.
Hearing that the Combined Franco-Spanish fleet under Vice-Admiral Pierre Villeneuve had retreated southwards to Cadiz after its confused encounter with Calder's squadron off Cape Finisterre on 22 July 1805, Napoleon turned his 'Army of England' about and marched on Austria, which had just declared war. He directed the fleets to sail into the Mediterranean in support of his operations, so on 19 October when Villeneuve left Cadiz with thirty-three battleships, he was starting a completely new campaign.
Waiting out of sight over the horizon was a British fleet of 27 battleships, commanded by Nelson. Following his epic chase of Villeneuve’s fleet to the West Indies and back in the previous summer, Nelson had gone on leave to Britain hoping for a rest. But he found that his reputation had been so enhanced by his recent exploits, that everyone wanted to see him, from the prime minister, to ordinary men and women. After only 25 days with Emma Hamilton and their daughter Horatia at Merton, he sailed from Portsmouth in the Victory on 14 September 1805.
By then the British had assembled a large fleet off Cadiz where Villeneuve had taken refuge. As soon as he arrived on 28 September, Nelson set about moulding his captains into a single fighting unit. Most had never served with him before. Nelson held dinner parties at which he explained his battle plan and then issued a memorandum summing up his tactical ideas. His plan, which he called 'The Nelson Touch', was very simple. He planned to concentrate one part of his force on the enemy rear, crushing it with superior gunfire. In the meantime, the rest of his ships would prevent the remaining enemy ships from coming to the aid of their comrades. He hoped that this would create 'a pell-mell battle' in which the superior gunnery and ship-handling of his crews would have maximum advantage.
Another Trafalgar myth is that this plan was completely new and the product of Nelson's personal tactical genius. In fact, none of the individual elements was particularly revolutionary – Nelson was building on years of tactical experiment in the Royal Navy.
What was new however, was the way in which he was prepared to discuss his plans in advance and having done so, to delegate responsibility to individual captains. As he wrote in his famous memorandum, 'No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy'. As the Combined Fleet emerged heading south for the Straits of Gibraltar, it was expertly shadowed by British frigates under Captain Henry Blackwood. As a result, Nelson was able both to chose the precise moment and the direction of his attack.
The two fleets sighted each other at about 06.00 hrs on 21 October but the wind was light and so the first shots were not fired until mid-day. As planned, the British fleet split into two divisions. One, led by Vice-Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood in HMS Royal Sovereign, headed for the rear of the Franco-Spanish line; while Nelson in HMS Victory aimed his division directly at their centre. Scarcely any operational signals were required – a tribute to the thoroughness of Nelson's pre-battle briefings.
Collingwood was first into action, firing a broadside into one of the Spanish flagships, the Santa Anna as he passed under her stern at about 12.20 hrs. He was followed by the ships of his division which approached in a slanting line, thus spreading the force of the impact and enveloping the allied rear as Nelson had intended.
Nelson meanwhile was heading towards the great Santissima Trinidad, easily recognisable with her four tiers of guns. But spotting that Villeneuve was flying his flag in the Bucentaure, the ship next astern, Nelson ordered Hardy to attack her first. The Victory passed under her stern firing a murderous broadside as she went, that gave the French vessel a knockout blow right at the start of the contest.
As the Victory moved on, she became entangled with the Redoutable, whose captain Jean Lucas had been gallantly trying to help his comrades; and the two ships drifted away, locked in a deadly close-quarters struggle. This created a large gap in the allied line through which the ships of Nelson's division then poured, thus splitting the enemy fleet in two – again, exactly as Nelson had intended.
Thereafter the battle developed into a ferocious pounding match. The French and Spanish ships fought with great bravery but they were isolated and leaderless, while the British were working to a single pre-concerted plan and with the advantage that they were much better trained in delivering rapid, accurate gunnery.
Collingwood's ships gradually subdued the allied rear, while Nelson's division first captured most of their centre and then fought off a belated counter-attack by the van under Rear-Admiral Dumanoir. When the battle finally ended at about 16.30 hrs, 17 enemy ships had been captured and another was a blazing wreck. Four ships escaped with Dumanoir, but were captured a few weeks later, and only 11 managed to struggle back into Cadiz, under the command of the Spanish senior admiral Gravina, who was himself badly wounded.
For the British, triumph at this extraordinary result was overshadowed by the news that Nelson was dead. Shot on his quarterdeck at about 13.15 hrs he was carried down to the Victory's cockpit where having been told of his great victory, he died at about 16.30 hrs. The triumph was further dissipated by a fierce storm that blew up after the battle, forcing the British to scuttle most of their hard-won prizes.
News of Trafalgar reached London about a fortnight after the battle in the early hours of 6 November, carried home in the schooner Pickle by Lieutenant John Lapenotiere. Public rejoicing for the victory was muted by widespread sorrow for the death of Nelson. Collingwood was made a baron, all the captains received the King's Naval Gold Medal and a special grant of money was made by the government to all those who had taken part, to compensate them for the prize money they had lost when their captures sank in the storm. Nelson's body was brought home to Britain and buried at St Paul's Cathedral.
Because it was so decisive, and because there were no other great set piece fleet actions in the rest of the war, Trafalgar has acquired a reputation for completeness that it does not really deserve. True, the Spanish fleet had been dealt a mortal blow from which it never really recovered, losing over a quarter of its effective battleships (eight out of 30) and perhaps more important, suffering serious casualties among its high command.
The French however had lost a smaller proportion of their effective fleet (13 out of 70) and these were later replaced in an extensive building programme. Moreover, Trafalgar had little immediate effect on the overall course of the war. The day before, Napoleon had defeated the Austrians at Ulm and six weeks later he was to confirm his ascendancy over Europe with an even more decisive victory over the Austrian and Russians at Austerlitz, 2 December 1805.
But the psychological effect of Trafalgar was immeasurable. The battle demonstrated that the Royal Navy had superiority in training, professionalism, and expertise in naval tactics that set it apart from its rivals. Above all, it gave the Royal Navy an unmatched tradition of victory that is still potent even 200 years later.
Part of the Nelson A to Z, Edited extracts taken from The Nelson Encyclopædia by Dr Colin White, Chatham Publishing London, 2002.