17 Nov 2014
November’s Item of the Month is a volume of the Diaries of Harry T. Bennett, navigating lieutenant in HMS Canopus (JOD/106/1), focusing on the Battle of Coronel which took place on 1 November 1914 off the Chilean coast. Left behind by Admiral Cradock, because she could not keep up with his battlecruisers, the Canopus and Bennett were not present at the actual battle, but they were amongst the first to receive news of the British defeat.
At the outbreak of the First World War the German East Asia Squadron was based at Tsingtao (Qingdao), China and under the command of Vice Admiral Maximilian Von Spee. Outnumbered by the allied naval presence in the area, Von Spee crossed the Pacific with the intention of raiding allied shipping along the western coast of South America.
Realising the potential damage these ships could cause, the Admiralty decided to reinforce the Cruiser squadron of Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock who was tasked with locating and engaging Von Spee. This reinforcement was to come in the form of the modern armoured cruiser HMS Defence, but shortly after receiving these orders the Defence was diverted elsewhere. As a result of this change of plans the only reinforcement Cradock actually received was the old pre-dreadnought battleship HMS Canopus, leaving him with a force of under-armed vessels, several crewed by inexperienced naval reservists.
Bennett’s diary contains plenty of detail on daily events and a large number of watercolours, mostly of the ships he encountered but some coastal scenery is included too. The sea was very rough and he frequently complained that the ship was rolling heavily with plates being smashed everywhere and his cabin ruined.
Cradock had been instructed by the Admiralty to stay with Canopus but felt that its slow speed, further compounded by engine trouble, would hinder his chances of catching Von Spee and bringing his force to battle. He may have had in mind the escape of the Goeben and Breslau earlier in the war and the resulting criticism the officers involved faced for their failure to engage them. As a result Canopus was left behind and Bennett’s entries regarding the battle reflect this with a sense of the distance from events and helplessness he obviously felt.
He recorded that at 5pm on 1 November Canopus intercepted a message from Glasgow to Good Hope that they had sighted enemy ships. Cradock then had all of his ships converge on Glasgow’s location. Bennett rather mournfully records ‘We in the Canopus being over 220 miles away & quite an impossibility to help’. After one more message from Good Hope to the other ships urging them to reach Glasgow nothing more was heard from the battle and he feared something had gone wrong.
Glasgow managed to escape the battle and it was from these survivors that much of Bennett’s information would come. Glasgow sent a message to the effect that they feared Good Hope was lost and the squadron had scattered. He notes his surprise that Chile, ‘a nation we always thought to be friendly’, was seemingly aiding the Germans by blocking the British communications from an onshore station. With the position of the enemy unknown and fearing Good Hope and Monmouth lost, the Glasgow and Canopus were forced to begin their retreat to the Falklands. Only later would it become clear both the Monmouth and the flagship Good Hope had been destroyed and over 1500 men lost including the admiral. Von Spee's squadron lost no ships and just three men.The rest of Bennett's entry is understandably focused on the shock and sense of loss that must have filled everyone on board as news from the Glasgow began to arrive:
‘Had we not had the engine room defect… or had we been 24 hours earlier we could not have failed to be on the scene of action and possibly helped Good Hope and Monmouth. It is a dreadful loss to us to think that Good Hope is lost & all our good friends gone and sadder still to think that 750 women in a few minutes in all probability were widowed.’
Earlier in the voyage he had spent a day aboard HMS Good Hope tracing charts and so obviously knew some of those who had been lost. He also noted how proud he felt when Admiral Cradock complimented him on the performance of his duties when he inspected the Canopus. Even if just in a private journal entry Bennett was in no doubt where the blame for the defeat lay, likely referring to the lack of reinforcements:
‘Glasgow reported that when Good Hope was last seen she was down by the bows, badly on fire and unmanageable. She then had a bad explosion – It is also feared that Monmouth is lost. If this is the case it is too dreadful for words & the Admiralty are to blame – Not Admiral Cradock’
It would later become clear that the British ships had been outmanoeuvred and outgunned by their German counterparts in the rough seas off Coronel. Bennett noted accounts from officers of the Glasgow who described how Good Hope and Monmouth were quickly hit and caught fire but continued fighting, with Glasgow herself engaged by two German light cruisers. They had trouble seeing the German ships against the grey background of the coast whereas the setting sun and flames highlighted the British ships for the German gunners. Both Good Hope and Monmouth were lost with all hands, over 1500 men, whereas the German ships sustained little damage.
Lieutenant Bennett and the Canopus would go on to play their part in the destruction of Von Spee’s squadron, firing the first shots at the Battle of the Falklands on 8 December 1914.
Mark, Library Assistant